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Introduction 
In recent years the UK government has advanced a now familiar rhetoric about its approach to 
addressing human trafficking, a key component of which has been the (self-)positing of the UK as a 
‘world leader in the fight against modern slavery’.1 The notion of ‘vulnerability’ has been central to the 
way in which the government has framed victims.2 For example, in May 2014 Theresa May, then Home 
Secretary, claimed that ‘[t]he men, women and children who are forced, tricked and coerced into 
servitude and abuse, are often the world’s most vulnerable.’3 This narrative of the ‘vulnerable victim’ 
has continued in Theresa May’s discussions of the issue as Prime Minister.4    
The concept of vulnerability is generally used in law to describe categories of people 
considered to be entitled to receive ‘extra care and attention’.5 In light of the prominence of vulnerability 
in the political discourse as a characteristic supposedly relevant to those trafficked, it might be 
reasonable to assume that the associated legal and policy framework, a component of which is the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA), would encapsulate such a safeguarding spirit. In reality, as this article 
demonstrates, the processes responsible for determining victimhood in the context of the UK’s modern 
slavery framework, such as the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), and those that regulate access to 
post-identification entitlements such as residence, are not working to advance the interests of 
vulnerable people and fail to deliver administrative justice.6 Individuals who are suspected to be victims 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer, Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool. I am grateful to Mike Gordon, Stephanie Reynolds and 
Helen Stalford, and the anonymous reviewer, for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts. I am also thankful to participants at 
a conference at the ICHR, NUI Galway, in May 2018 for thought-provoking comments on a version of this paper. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1Home Office, Modern Slavery and Supply Chains: Government Response. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448200/Consultation_Government_Respons
e__final__2_pdf.pdf>(accessed 18 July 2018).  
2 There has been criticism of the emphasis on prosecution to the detriment of protection, see V. Brotherton, ‘Is the UK a 
world leader in the fight against modern slavery?’, Open Democracy, 26 October 2016. 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/vicky-brotherton/is-uk-world-leader-in-fight-against-modern-slavery> 
(accessed 18 July 2018). 
3 T. May, A model that works: A government’s role in combating human trafficking, 9 April 2014.  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speecnd hes/a-model-that-works-a-governments-role-in-combating-human-trafficking> 
(accessed 18 July 2018). 
4 T. May, Defeating modern slavery (article written for Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2016. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defeating-modern-slavery-theresa-may-article> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
5 A. Morawa, ‘Vulnerability as a Concept of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 6(2) Journal of International Relations 
and Development, 139-155, 139. 
6 Thomas and Tomlinson describe the concept of administrative justice as concerning ‘both the making of administrative 
decisions and the systems for challenging such decisions’: R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson., ‘Mapping current issues in 
administrative justice: austerity and the ‘more bureaucratic rationality’ approach’ (2017) 39(3) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law, 380-399, 380. 
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of one of the offences falling within the ‘modern slavery’ umbrella7 do not have access to a fair and 
rigorous decision-making system.  
This article begins with an overview of the UK’s anti-trafficking framework which comprises the 
statutory MSA and the practical NRM. Drawing on Martha Fineman’s theoretical work, it explains the use of 
the concept of vulnerability as an analytical framework for the current UK system. The following sections then 
explore the ineffectiveness of this system as a tool for safeguarding people so overtly described as 
vulnerable. By means of an analysis both of the limitations of the NRM mechanism and of the framework by 
which recognised trafficking victims can seek to secure a right to reside in the UK, subsequent sections 
demonstrate that current legal mechanisms are insufficiently accessible to the majority of victims. The real 
possibility that individuals are subjected to unfair treatment is embedded across the system, spanning the initial 
victim identification to subsequent decisions around the residence entitlement of trafficking victims taken by the 
Home Office which, in its capacity as ‘gatekeeper’ of leave to remain status, is reticent to exercise its discretion. 
Consequently, there is a reliance on judicial review to challenge Home Office decisions, though crucially this fails 
to address the fundamental issues undermining the system. Ultimately, current frameworks and decision-
making procedures fail to effectively recognise and respond to vulnerability and, as such, do not provide 
trafficking victims with appropriate structures to build resilience in support of their recovery.  
 
The UK’s statutory anti-trafficking framework 
The UK’s legal response to trafficking is embedded within broader international and regional 
frameworks. In terms of international law, the UK is signatory to the Palermo Protocol8 and the Council 
of Europe Convention on action against trafficking in human beings 2005 (ECAT).9 The UK government 
also took the decision to opt-in to the 2011 European Union Directive on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (Directive 2011/36).10 The Palermo Protocol 
contains the well-established definition of trafficking which both ECAT and the Directive use as a 
foundation. This tripartite definition focusses on the action, means and purpose of trafficking. The action 
translates as the ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons’; the means 
includes ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person’; and the purpose is for 
exploitation. That exploitation ‘shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs’.11 The consent of a victim of trafficking to the intended exploitation 
is irrelevant where any of the means set out (i.e. coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power) 
have been used.12 
While the international regime exemplified by Palermo, ECAT and Directive 2011/36 utilizes the 
concept and process of trafficking, in the UK the anti-trafficking position has been presented principally 
under the broader banner of modern slavery.13 This agenda was driven forward by current Prime 
                                                          
7 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 includes within this human trafficking (s.1), slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory 
labour (s.2). 
8 UN Doc A/55/383, 2 Nov, 2000, annex II. The Palermo Protocol supplements the UN Convention against transnational 
organized crime (the CTOC). A second protocol addresses the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air: UN Doc 
A/55/383, 2 Nov 2000, annex III.  
9 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005, Warsaw, 16.5.2005, CETS No. 197. 
10 Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims OJ [2011] L101/1. 
11 Article 3, Palermo Protocol.   
12 When children are involved, it is sufficient that only the action and purpose elements are satisfied. 
13 Of course, the UK is not the only jurisdiction within which trafficking and slavery are increasingly conflated. For analysis of 
this in the ECHR caselaw, see R. Vijeyarasa and J. Villarino, ‘Modern Day Slavery A Judicial Catchall for Trafficking, Slavery 
and Labour Exploitation: A Critique of Tang and Rantsev’ 8 (2012) Journal of International Law and International Relations 
36-61. There are differing views on the appropriateness of the label ‘slavery’ within trafficking discourse. See C. Hoyle, M. 
Bosworth and M. Dempsey, ‘Labelling the Victims of Sex Trafficking: Exploring the Borderland between Rhetoric and 
Reality’ 20 (2011) Social and Legal Studies, 313-329.  
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Minister Theresa May during her tenure as Home Secretary from 2010-2016. The MSA reformed and 
consolidated the previously piecemeal law on human trafficking and related offences of slavery, forced 
or compulsory labour and servitude,14 and put in place a unified legislative regime to address these 
issues.15 In addition to providing detail on these offences,16 the MSA sets out maximum sentences for 
those convicted (with an increased term of life imprisonment).17 The MSA also makes provision for 
trafficking reparation orders to be made in order that victims receive compensation.18 In terms of victim 
protection, the Act contains a defence for victims who have committed an offence attributable to their 
slavery or trafficking situation.19  
 Not all of the provisions of the MSA are immediately operational, with some of the victim 
protection-relevant provisions requiring further action to render them meaningful.20 For example, there 
is a duty on the Secretary of State to make ‘reasonable’ arrangements, and to make regulations, so that 
specialist independent child trafficking advocates (ICTAs) are available to support and represent 
children when there are reasonable grounds to believe they may be victims of trafficking.21  
 
Contextualizing vulnerability 
The interaction of trafficking victims with decision-making processes is examined here through a 
vulnerability lens. The concept of vulnerability is embedded in debates about trafficking and modern 
slavery. Despite the high visibility of vulnerability as a term, its meaning and impact remain ill-defined 
and imprecise. As prominent vulnerability theorist Martha Fineman highlights, the concept is ‘in 
common use, but also grossly under-theorized, and thus ambiguous.’22 The United Nations has 
similarly recognized the ‘loose’ use of vulnerability in policy contexts:  
 
Vulnerability stems from many sources and can be traced to multiple factors rooted in physical, 
environmental, socio-economic and political causes. In essence, vulnerability can be seen as a state of 
high exposure to certain risks and uncertainties, in combination with a reduced ability to protect or 
defend oneself against those risks and uncertainties and cope with their negative consequences. It 
exists at all levels and dimensions of society and forms an integral part of the human condition, 
affecting both individuals and society as [a] whole.23 
 
This definition draws directly on Fineman’s main thesis that vulnerability is the primal human 
condition,24 but also details a number of particular factors which have the effect of enhancing 
vulnerability. In the trafficking context, such vulnerability-enhancing factors might be related to intrinsic 
elements, such as gender or age, or situational conditions, such as poverty or irregular immigration 
                                                          
14 This article focusses on the UK as a whole, though there are differences in the Act’s applicability across the devolved 
nations, with separate statutes applying to Northern Ireland and Scotland. See Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Class 
Acts? Examining modern slavery legislation across the UK (October 2016).  
15 Modern Slavery Act 2015, Chapter 30. Previously the relevant legal provisions were scattered across: Gangmasters 
(Licensing) Act 2004, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004, Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and 
Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
16 Sections 1 and 2. 
17 Sections 5 and 6. 
18 Sections 8-10. 
19 Section 45 and schedule 4. This represents an attempt to comply with the non-punishment principle in Article 26 of ECAT. 
20 Under section 49, statutory guidance should be produced on identifying and supporting victims. 
21 Section 48. The actual ‘roll out’ of ICTAs in England has been significantly stalled in practice. See House of Lords 
European Union Committee, Children in crisis: unaccompanied migrant children in the EU, HL Paper 34, 26 July 2016.  
22 M.A. Fineman, ‘The vulnerable subject: anchoring equality in the human condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism, 1-23 at 9. 
23 United Nations, Report on the World Social Situation, 2003, Social Vulnerability: Sources and Challenges, (UN: New York, 
2003), 8. 
24 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth-century Tragedies (1995, Routledge: New 
York); M. Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (2004, The New Press, New York). 
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status.25 While their existence can heighten the vulnerability of individuals to being trafficked, 
vulnerability can also manifest in the aftermath of trafficking. The anti-trafficking legal framework 
recognizes that vulnerability may be a precursor to the ‘act' of trafficking. The definition of trafficking 
which cascades down from the Palermo Protocol to measures such as ECAT and Directive 2011/36, 
and to the domestic legislation in the form of the MSA, contains ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ as 
one of the potential means that might be used in order to traffic persons. According to Lima de Pérez, 
vulnerability tends to be conceptualised broadly for the purposes of a determination of the existence (or 
not) of such an abuse. The focus is on whether there is greater susceptibility to being trafficked as 
opposed to a stricter determination of whether exploitation of a specific vulnerability actually took 
place.26 Vulnerability will, of course, likely continue to be experienced - and potentially intensify – 
following the action of trafficking as the process moves into the exploitation phase.27  
 By interrogating the interaction that potential victims of trafficking have with UK decision-
making procedures, it is possible to assess, first, the extent to which the relevant legal and 
administrative structures are able to respond to vulnerability (for example by being sensitive to the 
concerns individuals might have about presenting to the authorities, or by providing free and accessible 
legal advice). Secondly, by combining this with examination of the impact of legal challenges to 
decisions brought by individuals through courts and tribunals, it is possible to gain an understanding of 
the suitability of such legal action for actually confronting such vulnerability.  
 
Decision-making in the National Referral Mechanism: processes, outcomes and judicial reviews 
Although the MSA now details the legal landscape of human trafficking and slavery in the UK, for those 
victims wishing to avail themselves of the protections it purports to grant them, the route to seeking 
support from the authorities is via navigation of the NRM. Established in 2009 as part of the 
government’s national response to its obligations flowing from ECAT, the NRM is the process through 
which victims of trafficking are identified.28   
 
Processes within the NRM 
Under the standard NRM procedures, authorised first responders - which are either public authorities or 
NGOs and include the police force, the UK Border Force, the Salvation Army, Home Office UK Visas 
and Immigration, social services, and local authorities - refer individuals they believe may have been 
trafficked to a Competent Authority (CA). The CAs are the Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit 
(MSHTU), a component of the National Crime Agency,29 and UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI), a 
division of the Home Office. In practice, MSHTU decides which CA will assess the individual’s case. In 
cases involving UK, EU or EEA nationals, MSHTU makes the decision; in cases concerning non-
EU/EEA nationals, or EU/EEA nationals that are subject to immigration control, UKVI makes the 
decision. The CAs initially make a determination, which should be completed within five days of referral, 
as to whether there are ‘reasonable grounds’ (RG) to believe that someone may have been trafficked.30 
A positive RG decision then initiates a 45 day ‘reflection and recovery period’ within which the individual 
is entitled to support and assistance (including, for example, provision in safe house accommodation 
and medical support). During this period, evidence is gathered and a ‘conclusive grounds’ (CG) 
                                                          
25 J.L. de Pérez, ‘A Criminological Reading of the Concept of Vulnerability: A Case Study of Brazilian Trafficking Victims’ 
(2016) 25(1) Social & Legal Studies, 23-42, 25. 
26 J.L. de Pérez, ‘A Criminological Reading of the Concept of Vulnerability: A Case Study of Brazilian Trafficking Victims’ 
(2016) 25(1) Social & Legal Studies, 23-42, 25. 
27 See discussion below. 
28 Article 10 of ECAT. 
29 Formerly, UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC). 
30 The threshold here is ‘I suspect but cannot prove’. 
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decision should follow as to whether or not, on the balance of probabilities, the individual is considered 
to be a victim of trafficking.31  
The ‘rules’ determining how the NRM operates are established on a non-statutory basis in a 
series of Home Office-issued guidance,32 reflecting the executive-policy approach the UK has taken to 
satisfying its obligations under ECAT.33 The operation of the NRM does intersect with statutory 
guidance on related issues. For example, there is statutory guidance for local authorities on 
unaccompanied migrant children and child victims of modern slavery.34 This Department for Education-
issued guidance actually refers to the creation of ‘new statutory guidance due to be published by the 
Home Office in 2017 to provide extensive information for identifying and supporting all victims of 
modern slavery’.35 Presumably this is referring to section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act which imposes 
a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance on identifying and supporting victims.36 Such 
guidance has not yet transpired but there has been some momentum behind the call for its creation. 
Sarah Newton MP (former Home Office Minister) made a statement to parliament during a debate on 
modern slavery in October 2017.37 This included a commitment to set up a consultation on the 
preparation of statutory guidance in order to fulfil the requirement of s.49 of the MSA. However, as yet, 
there is no timescale for this to occur. Interestingly, the approach of legislation in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland to this issue is different: both the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 and 
Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 
2015 contain direct references to the obligations as to identification and protection of victims 
established in ECAT, it is only in England and Wales that such detail is omitted from the primary 
legislation and left within the remit of the Secretary of State. 
The non-statutory basis of the current Home Office guidance has implications for the 
robustness of the process as a vehicle for transparent and fair decision-making. Indeed, a Home Office-
funded review of the NRM in 2014 recognized that awareness of the decision-making processes was 
low.38 The rules can also be amended on a fairly flexible basis and, moreover, such changes to the 
system can take place without there being a need for parliamentary scrutiny or oversight. The NRM 
system has been characterized by geographic variability and operational fluidity, especially following 
the 2014 review. While modified decision-making processes targeted at quick access to support have 
                                                          
31 See further Home Office, Interim review of the national referral mechanism for victims of trafficking, 2 October 2014. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/interim-review-of-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-victims-of-human-
trafficking> (accessed 18 July 2018). See also Home Office, National referral mechanism guidance: adult (England and 
Wales), published on 12 September 2016 at 16-18. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-trafficking-victims-
referral-and-assessment-forms/guidance-on-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-potential-adult-victims-of-modern-slavery-
england-and-wales> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
32 E.g. Home Office, Victims of modern slavery – Competent authority guidance, version 3.0, published 21 March 2016. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521763/Victims_of_modern_slavery_-
_Competent_Authority_guidance_v3_0.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2018). See also Home Office, National referral mechanism 
guidance: adult (England and Wales), 12 September 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-trafficking-
victims-referral-and-assessment-forms/guidance-on-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-potential-adult-victims-of-modern-
slavery-england-and-wales (accessed 18 July 2018). 
33 Acknowledged by Hickinbottom, LJ in R (on the application of PK) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 98 (para. 15). 
34 Department for Education, Care of unaccompanied minors and child victims of modern slavery, published March 2017. 
<https://consult.education.gov.uk/children-in-care/care-of-unaccompanied-and-trafficked-
children/supporting_documents/Revised%20UASC%20Stat%20guidance_final.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
35 Department for Education, Care of unaccompanied minors and child victims of modern slavery, published March 2017, 
p.4. 
36 There is the option, as opposed to obligation, for regulations to be enacted on identifying and supporting victims pursuant 
to section 50 of the MSA. 
37 Hansard, vol 630, column 512. 
38 Home Office, Interim review of the national referral mechanism for victims of trafficking, 2 October 2014., para. 2.1.5. 
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been trialled in some English regions, these have not been rolled out more widely.39 Further change is 
likely following a meeting of the Prime Minister’s Modern Slavery Taskforce in October 2017. The 
outcome of this was a commitment by the government to introduce measures to both improve decision-
making within the NRM and support provided to victims, including the creation of ‘a single, expert unit to 
be created in the Home Office to handle all cases referred from front line staff and to make decisions 
about whether somebody is a victim of modern slavery, this will replace the current case management 
units in the National Crime Agency and UK Visas and Immigration.’40 While the abandonment of the 
two-stage system might be a welcome development,41 the proposed further entrenched dominance of 
the Home Office raises cause for concern. There has not been clear articulation of how potential 
conflicts of interest as regards to an individual’s status as a victim of trafficking with the Home Office’s 
responsibility for enforcing immigration law will be managed.42 Overall, the decision-making system has 
been reviewed, tinkered with and tweaked at incremental intervals, and in certain localities, but there 
has been a lack of urgency on the part of the government to follow-up on commitments made or 
policies partially initiated on a more certain and national scale.  
 
NRM referrals and outcomes 
Statistics published by the National Crime Agency demonstrate that in 2017 there were 5145 potential 
victims referred to the NRM (a 35 per cent increase on 2016 referrals).43 The referrals were made in 
relation to 2454 women (47 per cent); 2688 men (52 per cent); and three transgender people (<1 per 
cent). There were 3027 referrals on behalf of adults (59 per cent) and 2118 on behalf of children (41 
per cent). The statistics also show that 116 nationalities are represented within the NRM referrals, with 
Albanian, UK and Vietnamese the most commonly reported in 2017. Significantly, of the 5145 referred 
into the system in 2017, only 665 had received positive CG decisions (13 per cent) by 7th March 2018, 
the date the statistics were compiled. Of the 3804 referrals made in 2016, 1133 positive CG decisions 
had been issued by the 2018 compilation date (30 per cent). The proportion of those referred to the 
NRM who ultimately receive such positive decisions has been on a downward trajectory in recent years 
(36.8 per cent of those referred in 2015; 35.6 per cent of those referred in 2014 and 46.9 per cent of 
those referred in 2013).  
The 2017 statistics show that 1049 of those individuals referred during 2017 (20 per cent) had 
received a negative final decision at the date of compilation in March 2018, but it is clear that the reality 
for many of those referred into the system is a long period of waiting before a CG decision is reached. 
As of 7th March 2018, decisions were still pending in 3273 (63.6 per cent) of 2017 NRM referrals. 
Moreover, decisions in 1168 (30 per cent) of 2016 referrals and 515 (16 per cent) of 2015 referrals 
                                                          
39 See N. Ellis, C. Cooper and S. Roe, An evaluation of the National Referral Mechanism pilot, Research Report 94 (Home 
Office, October 2017). <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/653703/evaluation-
national-referral-mechanism-pilot-horr94.pdf > (accessed 18 July 2018). 
40 Home Office, Modern Slavery Taskforce agrees new measures to support victims, 17 October 2017. Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/modern-slavery-taskforce-agrees-new-measures-to-support-victims> (accessed 18 
July 2018). 
41 The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has been critical of the two-stage approach within the NRM, see 
Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, letter to Sarah Newton MP on the National Referral Mechanism. 
<www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/news-insights/letter-to-sarah-newton-mp-on-improved-national-referral-mechanism/> 
(accessed 18 July 2018). 
42 On the suspicion directed at illegal migrants by the UK Border Agency, see A. Balch and A. Geddes, ‘Opportunity from 
Crisis? Organisational Responses to Human Trafficking in the UK’ (2011) 13(1) British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 26-41 at 37. For a critique of the role of UKVI in NRM process see J. Elliott, ‘The National Referral Mechanism: 
querying the response of ‘first responders’ and the competence of ‘competent authorities’ (2016) 30(1) Journal of 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 9-30. 
43 National Crime Agency, National Referral Mechanism Statistics – End of Year Summary 2017 (April 2018). 
<www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/national-referral-mechanism-statistics/2017-nrm-statistics/884-nrm-annual-
report-2017/file > (accessed 25 July 2018). 
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remained outstanding.44 It is apparent, then, that many NRM applications are left clogged in the system 
for a number of years.45  Decision-makers within the CAs are expected to make the initial RG decisions 
within five days.46 Yet, in the case of CG decisions, the guidance does not stipulate a specific timescale 
other than to state the decision ‘will be made as soon as possible following day 45 of the recovery and 
reflection period’.47 While it is true that expediency is not necessarily indicative of quality decision-
making, it is also surely the case that a prolonged period of uncertainty around the outcome is far from 
desirable for the individuals concerned.   
Those who do receive a positive CG decision are given a further 14 days to exit the safe house 
accommodation that is provided following the positive RG decision, although there is a commitment to 
extend this post-CG support to 45 days bringing the total to 90.48 Those who receive a negative 
decision have only two days to leave such accommodation. Even for those that are found to be 
‘genuine’ victims of trafficking, then, government sanctioned (and, crucially, funded) support post-CG 
decision is still short-lived, even taking into account the plan to extend the duration of post-identification 
support.49 Consequently, given the fairly limited nature of the support provided to those who eventually 
receive a positive decision, the extended and drawn out decision-making process appears completely 
disproportionate to the substantive outcome. In reality, it is the RG, not the CG, decision that has 
potential to bring about most immediate and transformative impact for an individual in that it triggers the 
initial 45 day recovery period within which the individual is entitled to support. For many, the initial 
period of support will have expired by the time they receive a final decision.50 In reality, the significance 
of a positive CG decision will likely be related to its potential to trigger entitlement for legal aid to fund 
legal advice on the issue of securing a right to remain in the UK.51 In and of itself a positive CG decision 
remains rather inconsequential in what it delivers to the individual.   
 
Judicial review as the mechanism to challenge negative NRM decisions 
The sub-section above has drawn out some of the problems within the system and has also given a 
sense of the hollowness of the CG decision. Here, attention turns to the potential to challenge a 
negative decision, whether that be at the initial, RG, stage or the final, CG, stage. For those who 
                                                          
44 The statistics also provide that negative CG decisions had been received by 1325 (35 per cent) of those referred in 2016; 
and 1341 (41 per cent) of those referred in 2015. 
45 The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association corroborates the prolonged nature of many NRM referral applications. See 
ILPA submission to the review of the National Referral Mechanism, available at < www.ilpa.org.uk/resources.php/29120/ilpa-
submission-to-the-review-of-the-national-referral-mechanism-endorsed-by-the-anti-trafficking-le> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
46 Home Office, Victims of modern slavery – Competent authority guidance, version 3.0, published 21 March 2016, p.50. 
47 Home Office, Victims of modern slavery – Competent authority guidance, version 3.0, published 21 March 2016, p.64. 
48 The Home Office announcement can be accessed at < https://www.gov.uk/government/news/modern-slavery-victims-to-
receive-longer-period-of-support > (accessed 19 July 2018). 
49 Significant academic and NGO research suggests current provision is inadequate: Human Trafficking Foundation, Life 
Beyond the Safe House: Gaps and Options Review, July 2015 
<www.humantraffickingfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Life%20Beyond%20the%20Safe%20House_0.pdf>; FLEX, Fairwork 
and ADPARE, Improving the Identification and Support for Victims of Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in the EU, 
September 2016 <www.labourexploitation.org/sites/default/files/publications/PROACT%20Policy%20Paper.pdf> (accessed 
18 July 2018). This is echoed in a Report of the Work and Pensions Select Committee: House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee, Victims of Modern Slavery (Twelfth Report of Session 2016-17), HC 803, 30 April 2017. The Modern 
Slavery (Victim Support) Bill, which would provide one year of support – including financial – is due to be considered by the 
House of Commons in November 2018. 
50 This brings into question the UK’s compliance with its international obligations, in particular Articles 10 and 12 of ECAT. 
The combined effect of these provisions is arguably that following the RG decision the individual is in an extended recovery 
and reflection period (Art. 10(2)) and, as such, should be entitled to continue to access the relevant support (set out in Art. 
12). 
51 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, schedule 1, para 32. The UK government 
recently claimed it could restrict legal aid to trafficking victims but later conceded this point, see < 
www.atleu.org.uk/news/legalaidimmigrationadvice > (last accessed 19 July 2018) and the Consent Order in R (on the 
application of LL) v the Lord Chancellor CO/3581/2017.  
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receive a negative NRM decision, there are no formal avenues to lodge an appeal. Clearly, the non-
statutory nature of the NRM is an influencing factor here as, inherently, there can be no statutory right 
of appeal under the present system. The Home Office guidance for CAs does state that the CA can 
be requested to reconsider their decision should new evidence emerge.52 Consequently, there is an 
explicit suggestion that CAs will, through a process of informal reconsideration, be responsive to 
ongoing assessments and fresh insight, although the guidance is very clear to stress that judicial review 
provides the only official mechanism to challenge a negative NRM decision. The centrality of judicial 
review is starkly illustrated in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MS (Pakistan).53 The case 
involved an overlapping NRM referral and asylum application in relation to a child from Pakistan, both of 
which had been refused. In contrast to the CA, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 
(UTIAC) found that MS was a victim of trafficking.54 Accordingly, the UTIAC went on to find that MS 
could not be lawfully removed from the UK as the correct trafficking determination would, in turn, have 
triggered police investigation and prosecution proceedings requiring his presence in the territory.55 The 
Court of Appeal was very disapproving of this approach, finding the UTIAC had exceeded its jurisdiction 
by carrying out an ‘indirect judicial review’ of the negative RG decision. Trafficking decisions do not 
constitute ‘immigration decisions’ and, as such, fall outside the realm of the statutory appeals procedure 
in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.56 This decision clearly limits opportunities for 
negative NRM decisions to be reassessed under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and firmly restates the 
principal role of judicial review in its oversight of this strand of Home Office decision-making. 
  There are limitations to the scope of judicial review, both from an access perspective and in 
terms of the nature of the examination the court can give to the original decision.57 The application must 
be brought within three months and permission to proceed must be granted by the Administrative Court.58 Cost 
is also likely to be a consideration for many of those who seek to challenge a negative NRM decision. 
Under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, those in receipt of a 
negative reasonable or CG decision are entitled to legal aid to fund legal advice in relation to judicial 
review.59 However, there is no entitlement to legal aid prior to the RG decision. This has the effect of 
denying individuals the ability to access funding to receive legal advice before they enter the NRM. 
Nevertheless, the availability of legal aid to help bring about a judicial review to challenge a negative 
NRM decision can no doubt be valuable. Of course, it also presupposes that the individual concerned is 
aware of the possibility of doing so. In practice, it is clear that NGO/charitable organisations and 
advocates working on a pro bono basis play an important role here,60 and in raising awareness of 
available legal routes.61 
 A judicial review of a CA’s NRM decision will effectively result in an examination of whether 
there has been an error of law in the making of that decision. The court does not have jurisdiction to re-
examine the facts and cannot substitute its own decision when exercising this ‘supervisory’ function, as 
                                                          
52 Home Office, Victims of modern slavery – Competent authority guidance, version 3.0, published 21 March 2016, p.91. 
53 [2018] EWCA Civ 594. 
54 MS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKUT 226 (IAC), para. 59. 
55 MS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKUT 226 (IAC), para. 64. 
56 Secretary of the State for the Home Department v MS [2018] EWCA Civ 594, para 77 (per Flaux, LJ). 
57 For a recent discussion of judicial review in English public law see N. Duxbury, ‘The outer limits of English judicial review’ 
(2017) Public Law, 235-248. 
58 Judiciary for England and Wales, The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2017, July 2017. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647052/Admin_Court_JRG_2017_180917.p
df>  
59 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, schedule 1, para. 19. 
60 Such as ‘Advice on Individual Rights in Europe’ (AIRE Centre) <www.airecentre.org/index.php>  
61 The nature of NRM referrals means that frequently such challenges cross-cut with other immigration and asylum 
applications, appeals or judicial reviews of Home Office decisions in these areas. See R. Thomas, ‘Mapping immigration 
judicial review litigation: an empirical legal analysis’ (2015) Public Law, 652-678. 
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it is traditionally understood.62 However, it can, in those instances when it finds that the relevant 
decision-making process has not been lawfully followed, make a quashing order against the original 
decision and grant other discretionary remedies. Thus far, there have been no judicial reviews brought 
against decisions of the MSHTU in its capacity as CA, but a notable number of UKVI NRM decisions 
have had judicial review proceedings lodged against them. This is illustrated by taking into account a 
number of distinct yet related datasets. First, the Ministry of Justice’s statistics on judicial review show 
an increase in such claims lodged under the category of ‘immigration – human trafficking’ in recent 
years. For example, in 2013 only five cases were logged under this category; in 2016 this had risen to 
81. Of course, this coincides with the general increase in numbers referred to the NRM.63 Secondly, this 
also links in with the increasing rate of judicial reviews being brought against Home Office decisions in 
immigration and asylum matters more generally. Immigration-related matters account for over 80 per 
cent of all judicial review claims brought.64 In 2013, UTIAC), by Practice Direction, gained jurisdiction to 
hear some judicial review cases in such matters in an attempt to alleviate pressure from the 
Administrative Court.65 In 2016-17 13,372 judicial review claims were lodged against Home Office 
decisions in the UTIAC, of which 28 per cent ultimately found in favour of the claimant.66 The NRM-
related judicial reviews do not form part of the immigration and asylum case load which have been 
expressly transferred to the UTIAC,67 and so such cases are largely captured in the Administrative 
Court figures which evidence a comparatively lower success rate for claimants. For example, in 2016, 
1832 applications for judicial review were brought against the Home Office in the Administrative Court, 
across all areas, of which only 12 (1 per cent) ultimately found in favour of the claimant.68  
The combined impact of this quantitative data would appear to be that judicial review is playing 
an increasing role in the supervision of UKVI decision-making in the NRM, which tallies with the 
amplified use of judicial review in response to Home Office decisions more generally. The statistics do 
not suggest this judicial supervision is having particularly pronounced impacts on individuals in terms of 
the eventual outcomes, especially for those challenging NRM outcomes. This data snapshot also 
cannot capture the particular details of scenarios in which individuals have been able to achieve 
‘success’ in judicial review cases and when they have not, and therefore some consideration of the 
case law is also insightful. 
 Contrasting successful and unsuccessful judicial review cases highlights the limitations of 
judicial review of NRM decisions, which, intrinsically, is often an essentially process-focussed, 
formalistic assessment that is disconnected from the realities of the situation. In particular, the case law 
demonstrates how relying on judicial review to supervise decision-making under the NRM is effective in 
so far as it requires decision-makers to engage with existing guidance and protocols. Yet, it is not 
conducive to ensuring that individuals’ vulnerability is taken into account beyond the letter of the Home 
Office-issued guidance. First, AB v Secretary of State for the Home Department,69 provides an example 
of a successful judicial review challenge to an NRM decision. The Secretary of State's decision to 
refuse to recognize a claimant as a victim of trafficking was quashed where she had failed to engage 
                                                          
62 See Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223, esp 
at 228. 
63 Ministry of Justice statistical tables published at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/civil-justice-statistics-quarterly-
january-to-march-2017>  
64 R. Thomas, ‘Mapping immigration judicial review litigation: an empirical legal analysis’ (2015) Public Law 652-678 at 652. 
65 Consolidated Direction given in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and s. 18 of 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/lcj-direction-jr-
iac-21-08-2013-updated-2.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
66 Ministry of Justice statistical tables published at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/civil-justice-statistics-quarterly-
january-to-march-2017 (accessed 18 July 2018). 
67 However, there are examples of NRM issues intertwining with immigration and/or asylum issues considered by the UTIAC 
in judicial review proceedings, R (FT) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 331 (IAC).  
68 Royal Courts of Justice Statistical Tables published at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/civil-justice-statistics-
quarterly-january-to-march-2017> (accessed 18 July 2018). 
69 [2015] EWHC 1490 (Admin). 
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with the conclusions of medical and psychiatric and trafficking reports that supported the claim, and to 
explain why she had disagreed with them. The claimant was a Nigerian woman who had worked in 
domestic servitude since age six and had been trafficked to the UK by her employer. Heaton J, 
stressed the importance of taking expert reports into account, largely on the basis that the relevant 
guidance stipulated that they should form part of the decision-making process: 
 
That report expresses the opinion that the Claimant is a trafficked person. Of course that opinion does 
not bind the decisionmaker. However, the decisionmaker here fails to grapple with that opinion at all, or 
explain why she disagrees with it. In my judgment given the importance of this material as identified by 
the SSHD’s own policies the decisionmaker was under an obligation to recognise the conclusions of the 
report, engage with them and explain, however briefly, why she disagreed with them. In failing to do so 
in my judgment she again acted unlawfully in failing to have sufficient regard to her own policy and 
irrationally in that she did not take the opinion expressed in that report into account.70 
 
This represents a positive outcome for the claimant in the sense that her challenge was successful. 
Moreover, her particular characteristics of vulnerability, represented in the reports, influenced the 
court’s conclusion on the judicial review. However, this outcome was achieved only on the basis of an 
oversight by the decision-maker, who had not fully complied with the relevant NRM guidance. This 
rationale is similar to that seen in FX v Secretary of State for the Home Department.71 This case 
concerned an Ethiopian woman who challenged a negative RG decision. This woman had travelled 
from Ethiopia, first to Italy and then to the ‘Calais jungle’ refugee and migrant camp in France, with the 
involvement of an agent and a number of men. She had been locked in a room and raped on multiple 
occasions. There is extensive evidence in the court report of the traumatised nature of the claimant as 
a consequence of her experiences. Dove J found the decision to have been inadequate and unlawful 
on the basis, first, that the decision-maker appeared not to have considered that being locked in a 
room, which was only unlocked when a man entered in order to rape her, was capable of constituting 
harbouring by coercive means for the purposes of sexual exploitation.72 Secondly, the judge was critical 
of the failure to follow NRM guidance as regards how to follow up on individuals who have been 
referred to the system but are set to receive a negative CG decision (for example, the claimant or 
involved agencies had not been prompted to provide any further information to support the NRM 
claim).73 Here, like in AB, an individual that clearly was vulnerable had her position supported by the 
court, but this was only possible under the remit of the Court’s judicial review jurisdiction because there 
was an irregularity in the process which the decision-maker had followed on which to base such a 
finding. There was certainly no substantive findings about vulnerability or what, as a matter of law, this 
concept means. 
Conversely, BG v Secretary of State for the Home Department illustrates the fine line that can 
divide positive and negative NRM decisions and their subsequent judicial review.74 In particular it 
highlights that judicial review cannot as readily assist those who are unable to pinpoint a specific deficit 
within the decision-making process. Here, an Albanian woman had arrived in the UK in 2013. She had 
been in an abusive relationship in Albania and her boyfriend had demanded she work as a prostitute. 
Initially a St Pancras official and the Poppy Project charity had decided not to refer her, citing 
‘credibility’ issues owing to her unwillingness to provide details of her boyfriend, the client or a contact 
who had assisted her travel. Eventually, a referral was made following the intervention of the claimant’s 
solicitors, and a positive RG decision was issued. However, later, the CG decision found that on the 
balance of probabilities the claimant had not been trafficked but, rather, was a victim of severe 
                                                          
70 Para. 41. 
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72 Para. 45. 
73 Para. 49. 
74 [2016] EWHC 786 (Admin). 
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domestic abuse.75 In essence, this case illustrates how those identified as victims, in many instances, 
are not very different from those who are not. The decision, upheld by the High Court, may have been 
negative, but expert testimony had also been strongly in support of the opposite outcome.76 BG might 
be distinguished from AB or FX on the basis of a lack of a failure of proper process on the part of the 
defendant, such as failing to follow the relevant guidelines during the process. In AB, it was 
emphasized by the court that the SSHD had failed to engage with the conclusions of medical reports. 
The implication was that she was thus unable to render a lawful decision on the basis of a flawed 
decision-making process. In BG, in contrast, there had apparently been a level of engagement with the 
medical evidence with which the government ultimately disagreed. From one perspective, this brings 
into focus how individuals who are equally as vulnerable as those who have experienced improper 
process in their NRM decision can be left without recourse to pursue redress. From another 
perspective, however, this does not mean that judicial review is without any virtue as a vehicle for the 
promotion of justice. It can provide an ‘individual form of dispute resolution’ and, according to Halliday, 
‘[judicial review] can also be used to advance the direction of specific areas of public law or public 
policy, or as a way of raising political consciousness or political momentum.’77  
Legal practitioners are also likely to be influenced to contribute to the raising of consciousness 
by bringing forward similar cases. This analysis is useful as a counter-balance to the critique that 
judicial review can only ever bring about individualized benefits without broader significance, or 
‘peripheral in the sense of being unimportant to all save those directly concerned’.78 Indeed, research 
evidences the positive impacts that judicial review litigation can bring, both in terms of providing 
(sometimes vulnerable) people the opportunity to challenge decisions and with regards to the future 
behaviour of public bodies whose decisions are challenged.79  
To anchor this more directly in the specifics of the topic under investigation, it is important to 
keep in mind the particular government department whose decisions individuals seek to challenge in 
this way. The Home Office is not only responsible for the decision-making under the NRM but, 
especially in the absence of statutory victim identification system, is largely able to set the parameters 
of the system and guidelines on its own terms. The judicial review process frequently involves an 
examination of the extent to which UKVI decision-makers have followed the guidance of the Secretary 
of State but it is difficult to go beyond the constraints of this structure and provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the principles that underpin it. Even as the defendant, the Home Office 
maintains a dominant position due to the influence it has in setting the standard it is assessed against. 
This is reminiscent of Rawlings’s argument about the ‘backfire effect’ of judicial review whereby its 
existence can serve as a ‘legitimating device’ for the expansion of government power,80 albeit a more 
apt description in the current case might be the maintenance of government (Home Office) influence.  
Acknowledgment of the Home Office’s lingering control, even in those cases it is technically 
‘losing’, is consistent with research on the behaviour of the Home Office in immigration and asylum 
challenges. Thomas has exposed the tendency of the Home Office to ‘tactically concede’ by 
reconsidering some challenges on an individual basis, rather than allowing the courts to decide upon 
the legal issues under consideration, which would carry with it the risk of certain policies being found 
unlawful.81 In essence, the Home Office uses tactical concession to ‘prevent the creation of precedent 
                                                          
75 Para 39. 
76 Para 41. 
77 S. Halliday, ‘The influence of judicial review on decision-making’ (2000) Public Law 110-122, 122. 
78 R. Rawlings, ‘Modelling Judicial Review’ (2008) 61(1) Current Legal Problems, 95-123, 97. 
7979 L. Platt, M. Sunkin and K. Calvo, Judicial Review Litigation as an Incentive to Change in Local Authority Public Services 
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unfavourable to its wider interests likely to benefit a number of individuals’.82 In respect of the NRM 
procedure, the existence of the informal process of reconsideration currently referred to in the guidance 
has similar implications. This casual, ‘off the record’ challenge to decisions enables UKVI to amend any 
erroneous decisions without oversight or external scrutiny. The grasp that the Home Office has on the 
terms and operation of the NRM system is not conducive to ensuring that the process of identifying 
victims of trafficking is working to protect vulnerable people, or, that they encounter administrative 
justice should they seek to challenge a resulting decision.  
 
Decision-making on entitlement to leave to remain for identified victims of trafficking 
For those people that do receive a positive CG decision under the NRM, either initially or following a 
challenge, a second decision-making process that they may encounter concerns leave to remain in the 
UK. A right of leave to remain is not automatically extended to identified victims of trafficking. Article 14 
of ECAT provides that residence permits should be issued in two circumstances: if a stay is considered 
necessary owing to the individual’s personal circumstances; or their stay is necessary for the purpose 
of their co-operation with the CAs in investigation or criminal proceedings.83 The position in the UK on 
the granting of leave to remain is in a state of flux at the time of writing. Up until February 2018, the 
guidance for CAs – which purported to comply with Article 14 of the Convention - emphasized that the 
Home Office would automatically consider whether a grant of discretionary leave was appropriate 
following a positive CG decision,84 but went on to state that there must be ‘compelling reasons based 
on their individual circumstances’ to do so.85 In the case of PK (Ghana) v Secretary of the State for the 
Home Department,86 the Court of Appeal found that Article 14 merely requires consideration of 
personal circumstances which could only be assessed by reference to the primary objective of ECAT: 
the protection and assistance of victims.87 Therefore, the requirement of compelling circumstances set 
too high a threshold.88 Following this judgment, the Home Office produced interim guidance placing all 
refusals of discretionary leave to remain (DLR) to victims of trafficking on hold,89 meaning that the 
system is at standstill with cases for consideration building up. It is unclear on what timescale new 
guidance will be issued but, assuming the Home Office complies with the ruling, it should specify that 
the test for such a grant of DLR is one of necessity in order to meet the objective of providing protection 
and assistance to victims. 
 Unsurprisingly, the ‘compelling circumstances’ test has coincided with very low numbers of 
grants for leave to remain being issued to identified victims. In 2015 only 123 (12 per cent) of those who 
received a positive CG decision were granted such a right to reside.90 Furthermore, when such 
residence permits are granted, they tend to be of 12 months duration only.91 This is perplexing when, 
undoubtedly, the protection of those who have been trafficked will often best be served by securing 
                                                          
82 R. Thomas, ‘Mapping immigration judicial review litigation: an empirical legal analysis’ (2015) Public Law 652-678, 669. 
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leave to remain in the receiving country,92 and accordingly gaining access to rights associated with 
lawful residence, including access to formalized support structures.93 For the time being at least, EEA 
nationals will, on the whole, have a right to reside on the basis of EEA Treaty rights.94 As a result, it is 
mostly those from outside of the EEA for whom an application for discretionary leave will have most 
resonance. There is also the possibility of an asylum application being an avenue to residence, but 
there are limited opportunities for non-EEA trafficking victims to secure a right to reside in the UK in the 
absence of an additional distinct claim.95 The implication of a person not securing DLR is that the label 
of illegality is extended to them.96 This renders them susceptible to the application of immigration 
enforcement, including detention and removal, in spite of their status as an identified victim. The 
Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill,97 which originated in the House of Lords, is scheduled to be 
discussed in the House of Commons in November 2018. In its current form, the Bill proposes to provide 
identified victims with one year of support in the UK, to include one year DLR but it is unclear what 
reception it will receive from MPs. 
 PK was an appeal from the High Court decision in R (on the application of K) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, in which Picken J had (incorrectly) found the Home Office guidance 
compatible with ECAT. PK encapsulates how judicial review can be used to challenge policy itself, as 
opposed to application of policy by decision-makers to a particular set of circumstances.98 
Consequently, it demonstrates how judicial review can have broader justice implications; this challenge 
may have the future result of advancing the potential of (vulnerable) identified victims to be granted 
DLR. Given the centrality of ECAT to this outcome, this case is also illustrative of how judicial review 
has undergone adaptation and expansion, particularly as a result of the UK’s membership of the 
Council of Europe (and EU), and the enhancement in human rights standards by public bodies this has 
necessitated.99  
 
Judicial review of decisions refusing leave to remain to individual victims of trafficking 
With regards to individual challenges to decisions refusing DLR, it is clear from the guidance that ‘there 
is no automatic right of appeal if after a decision is made under the NRM, no limited leave is granted by 
the Home Office.’100 Given the similarity between this approach on DLR and that relating to the ability to 
challenge NRM decisions, much of the earlier discussion about reliance on judicial review and the 
influence of the Home Office is relevant here also. There are, though, distinctive elements of the case 
law pertaining to DLR decision challenges that are worthy of exploration in their own right. In particular, 
there seems to be a connection between the Home Office making mistakes as to the NRM decision-
making process and the willingness of the court to accept subsequent challenges about the 
determination of DLR. 
 While the post-PK policy on the granting of DLR may provide a somewhat more accessible 
threshold, it will, of course, remain the case that the Secretary of State retains the decision-making 
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power.101 The Court of Appeal might have found that Picken J had erred on the compatibility of the 
compelling circumstances test issue in K, but Hickinbottom LJ was also clear that it was only this one, 
narrow ground of appeal which was implicated and no doubt was cast on other aspects of Picken J’s 
judgment in the High Court. Thus, a distinction drawn by Picken J in K between the ‘primary’ decision of 
whether a person is a victim and the ‘secondary’ decision as whether a residence permit is to be 
granted, remains valid.102 The effect of the demarcation between such primary and secondary concerns 
is stifling in that the status of ‘trafficking victim’ is rather futile in a real-life context in the absence of any 
attached right to stay in the UK. Yet the reluctance on the part of the courts to be seen to be 
encroaching on the jurisdiction of the SSHD to decide on the granting of leave for individuals in the 
immigration sphere is perhaps understandable in light of the politically contentious nature of the 
issue.103  
There are, however, examples of the judiciary adopting a stronger position. The case of R 
(Atamewan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department104 saw the High Court take steps to ensure 
the short-term residency of a trafficking victim in judicial review proceedings. The claimant’s asylum 
claim had been refused and she had received a negative NRM (RG) decision in February 2011, despite 
recognition that she had been brought to the UK as a child and exploited by her aunt.  She was 
detained in August 2011 and then was returned to Nigeria. The NRM decision, however, was then 
found to be unlawful on the basis that it, and the guidance at the time, failed to recognize historic 
trafficking as valid and misinterpreted ECAT. The subsequent removal of the claimant had been 
particularly unfortunate from the point of view of the claimant’s wellbeing as she had been able to ‘move 
on with her life’ (a point acknowledged in the NRM decision itself) and establish friendships and a 
relationship in the UK.105 The High Court considered that if the SSHD had correctly concluded that the 
claimant was a trafficking victim, she could not have been detained and removed at such an early 
stage. It then took the unusual step of granting a mandatory order that the SSHD should use her ‘best 
endeavours to secure the return of the claimant to the UK from Nigeria’ and ‘grant the claimant 12 
months and 1 day’s DLR in the UK’.106 This represents a positive outcome in the short-term for this 
particular victim of trafficking, although the Court was also keen to emphasize that there was no 
obligation to allow the claimant to stay indefinitely. Further, the claimant’s willingness to take part in 
police investigations was cited as a key reason to allow her return to the UK for a year.107 In other 
words, the right to reside was limited in its scope and was connected to the claimant’s promise to 
cooperate with the authorities. This outcome was also tied to the particular circumstances of the case 
which concerned the failure to recognize historic trafficking claims, therefore it has limited broader 
significance.   
Another such case is R (FT) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.108 This claim was 
heard by the UTIAC under its judicial review jurisdiction, but it reflects similar principles to that of the 
High Court in Atamewan. Here, the UTIAC overturned decisions made by the SSHD relating to DLR for 
a victim of trafficking. This particular man had previously had an (incorrect) negative NRM decision, had 
been detained for four years and had a removal order issued. Essentially, there had been repeated 
errors with regards to his status. He had, eventually, been granted six months DLR but medical 
evidence concluded he required in-depth psychological treatment that could take up to two years to 
complete. The evidence also indicated that such treatment could not be effective unless he felt he was 
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in a stable position. The UTIAC took these factors into consideration and, after quashing the decision to 
give six months DLR, remitted the decision back to the SSHD, although it did stress there was no 
expectation that indefinite leave to remain would be granted.109 The rationale of the judgment is 
encapsulated in the following: 
 
The duration of leave is ultimately a matter for the respondent, but her decision must lawfully reflect the 
matters identified in this judgment including the protracted history of this litigation, the applicant’s clear 
vulnerability, the unchallenged recommendations in the medical evidence and [the Secretary of State’s] 
own conduct.110 
  
Both of these cases concerned errors on the part of the SSHD and the court, subsequently, seeking to 
offer some recompense. For the individuals concerned, the judgments had significant, positive impacts. 
They also evidence what Richard Rawlings has termed ‘the judges’ “flexible friend”: the expanded 
‘judicial tool-kit of remedies’,111 especially declaratory relief which afford the courts a fairly creative 
licence to direct the decision-makers. Nevertheless, the somewhat exceptional nature of cases like 
Atamewan and FT should not divert attention from the reality that for those identified victims refused 
DLR, there will be little opportunity to formally question and challenge the decision. The direct 
implication for the analysis here is that it is only following an error in the original NRM decision-making 
process that the court (or tribunal) has been willing to intervene during judicial review proceedings and 
make an order as to the subsequent determination of entitlement to leave. In the absence of any such 
error (as in Adesanya112 in which the NRM decisions had not been through any challenge) there would 
appear to be very little scope for individuals to challenge refusal of DLR.  
In general then, there remains potential for vulnerability to be compounded by the uncertainty 
of victims’ residence status and poorly effected procedures with inconsistent outcomes. Even in the 
cases in which the claimants were ‘successful’, Atamewan and FT, the uncertainty, and indeed 
vulnerability, did not end with the conclusion of the court proceedings. Instead, the individuals were left 
in a state of limbo while the issue of their entitlement to reside was remitted back to the SSHD. 
Furthermore, the courts and tribunals are very careful to couch the orders to the Secretary of State in 
pacifying language, emphasizing that the grant of leave given need only be the bare minimum time 
required to enable the individual to access treatment. This overlooks the reality that a grant of DLR for 
one year will, in many cases, be insufficient to enable genuine long-term recovery. The following 
section considers how the vulnerability label, so readily attributed to victims, could have more valuable 
consequences. 
 
The value of the vulnerability label  
Vulnerability is a term that is employed frequently in policy documents, political statements and court 
judgments (such as FT above) to describe those who have been trafficked. Such demarcation should 
not be accepted uncritically. Scholars such as Vijeyerasa emphasize that this portrayal of trafficked 
victims, which presents traits such as naivety and vulnerability as intrinsic, disregard the possibility of 
individuals exercising any agency during the process of trafficking and subsumes experiences into a 
standardised narrative.113 A key aspect of Fineman’s theory is that the state (and, by implication, its 
law) fails to respond adequately to vulnerability due to its preoccupation with the ‘liberal subject’ and the 
consequent privileging of autonomy as s supreme quality. Fineman advocates for an alternative vision - 
the responsive state - which recognizes the universality of vulnerability and responds to it on the basis 
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of more collective values, such as connectedness and interdependence.114 Under the current schema, 
however, vulnerability is a label with negative connotations that tends to be reserved for ‘vulnerable 
populations’. The consequence of such labelling is stigmatisation as vulnerability is associated with 
inadequacy represented by a failure of autonomy.115 This analysis can be applied to victims of 
trafficking: this group is deemed to be more vulnerable to harm on the basis, first, of the circumstances 
that contributed to them initially being trafficked (which might include poverty, age, and education-level) 
and, secondly, as a result of the exploitation that occurred through the process of trafficking. Fineman 
argues that such (stigmatising) designation as a vulnerable population may be motivated by protection 
(as with children or the elderly) or control (as with at-risk youth or single mothers).116 Both of these 
elements are relevant to victims of trafficking when examined from the standpoint of a vulnerable 
population. On the surface, the decision-making processes may be presented as necessary for the 
protection of victims; yet the framework they encounter also encompasses elements of control. For 
example, the NRM records individuals’ presence in certain safe houses and localities for set periods of 
time. This ties in strongly with the proposition that the extension of the vulnerability status to particular 
groups can lead to political and legal ‘surveillance and regulation’ and, ultimately, can have ‘punitive 
and stigmatizing’ consequences.117 For victims of trafficking, the most extreme example of such 
consequences is surely their enveloping within punitive immigration policies as a result of the failure to 
grant many with leave to remain.  
 Thus far, the analysis through the prism of vulnerability is pessimistic and the label of 
vulnerability appears not to reap rewards for this group. However, there are ways in which the current 
framework could be altered to render the designation as vulnerable more meaningful. From Fineman’s 
point of view, building resilience can provide a solution:  
 
Although nothing can completely mitigate our vulnerability, resilience is what provides an individual with 
the means and ability to recover from harm, setbacks and the misfortunes that affect our lives.118  
 
The decision-making procedures, and broader legal responses to trafficking in the UK, could go further 
than recognizing vulnerability and respond to it in a way that moves closer to enabling people to build 
resilience and recover from harm. Considering the pros and cons of alternatives is beyond the scope of 
this article but this discussion has already brought to the fore certain problematic aspects of the current 
approach. For example, one option could be to formalise the NRM on a statutory basis and to create a 
statutory right of appeal, potentially opening up and expanding the opportunities to challenge beyond 
the realm of judicial review. This would not be the ‘easy option’, especially in light of the possibility for 
pressures in the system to be intensified as a result of the right of appeal, but it could enhance 
transparency in decision-making and improve awareness of the system. There are also ways in which 
the legal framework could be amended to support the resilience of victims. An obvious example would 
be for the House of Commons to fully embrace the proposed Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill 
which proposes a statutory right to residence for a defined period of one year. It would be necessary to 
put in place safeguards to ensure that any automatic right to DLR that attached to a positive CG 
decision did not have a corresponding limiting impact on the number of those identified as victims under 
the NRM. The long-promised statutory guidance on identifying and supporting victims in section 49 of 
the MSA 2015 could also be issued by the Secretary of State.  
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Overall, a key way to build resilience would be to make categorisation as ‘vulnerable’ deliver 
more meaningful impact to victims of trafficking. A stipulation in the statutory framework, for example, 
that an individual’s vulnerability should be the overriding factor to be taken into account when decisions 
are taken by the Home Office regarding their status and entitlement to remain, or by courts and 
tribunals in their reviewing capacity, could start to inculcate an approach that encourages outcomes 
more suited to the development of resilience. This leads on (or back) to the elephant in the room in this 
discussion: a barrier to resilience-building for victims of trafficking is the close proximity between law 
purporting to protect victims and restrictive immigration rules. It is difficult to foresee how victims of 
trafficking could be genuinely incorporated into a system which recognizes and responds to 
vulnerability without them being completely removed from the reach of the competing objectives of the 
immigration system or, at least, there being recognition of the role that immigration status plays in 
inducing vulnerability. The UK Supreme Court recognized this to an extent in Taiwo v Olaigbe and Onu 
v Akiwu,119 although it did not have a direct impact for the claimants in the particular case. Both 
claimants were Nigerian migrant domestic workers who had been exploited by their employers. Such 
treatment was not found to be contrary to the Equality Act 2010 as it had not occurred because of the 
claimants’ race (the definition of which includes nationality); rather, it was their immigration status which 
made them vulnerable. The claimants had limited leave to enter the UK on overseas domestic workers’ 
visas. These visas are renowned for exacerbating precarious immigration status as they make 
residence dependent on the specific employer to whom they are ‘tied’.120 Significantly, Lady Hale 
recognized that if the employers had employed non-British nationals who had the right to live and work 
in the United Kingdom, they would not have treated them so badly.121 The claimants’ ill-treatment was 
not therefore related to their nationality, and the claim for direct racial discrimination failed, leaving the 
women without redress. 
The significance of this for the analysis here is that Lady Hale expressly acknowledges that 
insecure immigration status can be a precursor to vulnerability. It was not a personal characteristic, 
such as gender, age, or race; furthermore, it was not an external problem connected to the economic, 
social or political context in the country from which the individual had travelled. Instead, the driver for 
the vulnerable position the claimants found themselves in in Taiwo was directly linked to an element of 
the UK’s immigration policy. The evidence presented throughout this article effectively builds on this 
observation by demonstrating that current decision-making procedures are also responsible for 
compounding the vulnerability of people. As such, while the political pronouncements around the MSA 
have emphasized vulnerability as a key characteristic of those trafficked, this belies the role that UK law 
and procedure is playing in reinforcing and extending such vulnerability. 
 
Conclusion 
Decision-making within the anti-trafficking framework in the UK is fraught with issues that weaken any 
claim that the system is operating in a just way that enshrines a commitment to protecting vulnerable 
people. It is the combination of parts of the procedures, the limitations on the potential to challenge and 
the subsequent implementation of the processes by the Home Office which conspire together to create 
this effect. A major influencing factor that shrouds the system in its entirety is the far-reaching influence 
of the Home Office. In some respects, its power is upfront, as when it is responsible for making direct 
decisions. Yet the Home Office also wields a softer and less blatant form of control. This comes about, 
first, due to the use of informal ‘reconsideration’ of decisions which allows it to remove from official 
public scrutiny decisions made in error. Secondly, even within the ambit of judicial review, the Home 
Office is able to shape the standards against which it is judged on individual decisions owing to the 
important role of its guidance in establishing the ‘rules’. Judicial review has brought about positive 
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results for some claimants but the success of any individual claim will be influenced by a focus on 
proper process and outcomes will inevitably be unpredictable owing to the arbitrary nature of judicial 
review decisions.   
Vulnerability is a concept which has been interwoven throughout the article. Despite its 
centrality to the political conceptualisation of trafficking as a form of modern slavery, there is no clear 
articulation within the corresponding legal framework of what actually constitutes vulnerability, including 
how it might intersect with immigration status of varying kinds, or of what would be an appropriate 
resilience-building response to vulnerable people to enable genuine recovery. This opaqueness around 
the concept masks the dichotomy between the sentiment of protection in the political rhetoric and the 
reality of how many people experience the system. It is the ultimate insult to those who persevere in 
their navigation of the system that even a CG decision yields limited entitlement to support and offers 
no security of residence. For many victims of trafficking, the current approach of the UK, at best, 
amounts only to an offering of tea and sympathy.  
